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Introduction 
The development of the formal financial sector in rural 
areas is a major policy goal in the Philippines. Financial con-
straints are widely regarded as an important reason for small 
farmers' low income and apparent problem of achieving potential 
yields from the new rice technology. The informal financial 
market consisting of private moneylenders, landlords, friends, 
and relatives is considered ill-equipped to meet the requirements 
of modernizing agriculture. The relatively high interest rates 
in this market may limit adoption of socially profitable tech-
nical ,innovations. The volume and term structure of lending 
operations are confined to small, short-term loans. Finally, 
inforID:al lenders rarely extend any supervision, technical 
assistance, nor savings deposit services. 
This paper analyzes the performance and problems associated 
with current agricultural credit policies in the Philippines. 
The first three sections briefly describe the institutional and 
policy setting, the historical growth of the rural financial 
marke~, and the performance of supervised credit programs in 
terms of credit delivery, repayment rates, farm level impact, 
and income redistribution. Most of the materials reviewed have 
been based on the institutional level information previously 
compi~ed and reported by the Technical Board on Agricultural 
Credit (TBAC) and several farm level studies conducted by 
graduate students and other researchers .. !/ In the last section, 
!/ TB~C supports the Presidential Committee on Agricultural Credit 
(PCAC). The Agricultural Credit Plan, 1977-82 by PCAC contains 
many of the tables cited in this paper. 
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the policy implications of the empirical analysis are dis-
cussed'. 
Institutional and Policy Setting 
Agricultural credit policy in the Philippines generally aims 
at exp~nding the amount and geographic coverage of formal insti-
tutional credit. On the supply side, establishment of rural 
banks,, commercial banks, and cooperatives to serve the rural 
sector, have been promoted. A great variety of incentives and 
I 
adminibtrative fiats have been used to shift bank portfolios 
towards agricultural lending. Concessionary interest rates are 
a prinpipal policy tool on the demand side. Supervised credit 
programs (SCPs) have also been initiated to serve the small 
farmers dominating Philippine agriculture. 
Formal 1 institutions 
currently several institutions provide credit to the 
agricultural sector (Table 1). Until recently, private com-
mercia~ banks furnished the bulk of agricultural loans granted. 
Rural banks have increasingly gained importance and now operate 
in about 60 percent of municipalities. The Rural Bank Law 
' (R.A. No. 72) passed in 1952 represents the first attempt to 
induce private sector participation in rural financial activities. 
Incent~ves granted include a 50 percent government equity con-
tribut~on, access to preferential rediscount rates, tax exemptions, 
and technical assistance. Rural banks are currently the major 
vehicle for implementing government sponsored SCPs. 
-3-
Table 1. Formal Institutions in the Rural Financial Market 
in the Philippines, 1978. 
Type 
Private institutions 
cbmmercial Banks 
Riural Banks 
Savings and Loan Associations 
' Private Development Banks 
Publici institutions 
Philippine National Bank 
Total 
i 
Development Bank of the 
· Philippines 
I 
Agricultural Credit 
Administration 
Land Bank of the Philippines 
Number 
30 
850 
117 
33 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1,034 
i l/ Not! all include agriculture in loan portfolio 
' ~/ So~rce: [22] 
Total Outlets 
931.!./ 
887 
200 
146 
177 
13 
26 
7 
2,387 
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~he Philippine National Bank (PNB) is the largest govern-
ment f 1inancial institution and commercial bank in the country. 
Financing of export crops, particularly sugar, however, dominates 
their loan portfolio. The Development Bank of the Philippines 
(DBP) focuses on medium and long-term credit needs of rice 
millirig, coconut, livestock and other agri-hased processing 
indusbries. The Land Bank of the Philippines finances land 
I 
ownership transfers under the Land Reform Program and administers 
I 
the loan guarantee program extended to participating institutions 
I 
I 
in the SCPs. 
Tihe Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), formerly the 
Agric~ltural Credit and Cooperative Farmers' Association (ACCFA) 
I 
was crieated in 1952 to develop small farmer cooperatives and 
: 
I 
supply'. them with short-term production and marketing credit. 
I 
Becaus~ of serious default problems, ACCFA's functions were 
trirnme1d in 1963 to administering unsecured production loans to 
Land Rjeform Program beneficiaries on a very limited basis and 
it wa~ renamed ACA [20]. 
Policiies and programs 
'Dhe Monetary Board regulates interest rates and charges 
withid the 16 percent ceiling on interest rates set by the Usury 
Law. jAt present, secured and unsecured loans are allowed max-
imum i!nterest rates of 12 percent and 14 percent, respectively, 
other ,charges of 2 percent and advanced interest payments. 
Longe:r1 term loans of more than 730 days may charge up to 16 percent 
I 
interdst and 3 percent for other charges. Supervised credit 
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bears .a lower interest rate of 10 percent with additional charges 
not eJceeding 3 percent. With respect to deposits, maximum 
savings interest rates are currently 7.5 to 8.5 percent for 
90 day deposits, and 12.5 percent for time deposits of 730 days. 
Rapid inflation rates during the 1970's in the order of 
20 pe~cent have meant negative real interest rates for borrowing 
and savings. This price structure in formal financial markets 
would 1naturally result in excess demand for credit because 
borrowers are rewarded and savers penalized. Given the higher 
cost df agricultural lending, it is not surprising that both 
publid and private financial institutions generally allocate 
very l~ttle of the total loanable funds and the implied subsidy 
to the agricultural sector, especially small farmers. Thus, 
on several occasions, special credit programs have been intro-
duced to reach small farmers without any loan collateral. 
Table 2 lists the various specialized agricultural credit 
I 
programs since the 1950's. Except for the CB-IBRD Loan Program, 
all other programs extended unsecured short-term credit coupled 
with technical assistance and regulations about the use of loan 
proceeds. 
Masagana 99 (M99) is the most complex and ambitious of 
these programs. Programs after M99 attempted to disseminate 
supervjised credit to non-rice producing small farmers. M99 was 
I 
motivated by a series of crop losses due to the tungro outbreak, 
and extensive flood and drought damage in the early 1970's. 
The need to provide an alternative source of credit for tenants 
affected by land reform was another reason. In addition to 
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Table 2: Special Agricultural Credit Programs 
in the Philippines, 1953 - 1978 
Name Period Agencies 
1) Agricultural Credit and 1953-1961 A:CCPA 
Cooperative Farmers Asso-
ciation (,4.CCFA) 
2) Agricultural Credit 
Administration (ACA) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
Agricultural Guarantee 
Loan Fund (AGLF) 
Agricultural Guarantee 
Fund (AGF) 
Central Bank--Interna-
tional BarUt and Recon-
struction Development 
Loan Mechanization 
Program (OB-IBRD) 
Masagana 99 
Masaganang Maisan 
Gulayan sa Kalusugan 
Tobacco Financing Program 
Integrated Agricultural 
Financing1-Coconut 
I 
Cotton Financing Program 
12) Integrate~ Agricultural 
Financing I 
Source: [ 2 2 ] , 
1963-present ACA 
1972-1973 
1972-1973 
1965-1974 
June 1973 
to present 
July 1974 
to present 
Dry 1975-76 
to present 
Oct. 1975 
to present 
1974-
present 
Rural Banks 
Rural Banks 
Rural Banks 
(90 percent) 
Savings & 
Loan Assocs. 
(10 percent) 
Rural Banks 
PNB, ACA 
Rural Ban'k:s, 
PNB 
Rural Banks 
Rural Banks 
Rural Banks 
Rural Banks 
Rural Banks 
Type of 
Enterprise 
Financed 
Rice 
Rice 
Rice 
Rice 
Not specific, 
mostly sugar 
Rice 
Corn and other 
feed grains 
Vegetables 
Tobacco 
Coconut 
Cotton 
Multiple 
Crop 
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conce~sionary priced loans, supervision, group lending, and 
I 
subst~ntial fertilizer subsidy in the early phases of the program 
were also important features. 
'Tihe CB-IBRD Loan Program provided medium and long-term 
I 
loans 'for the purchase of tractors, irrigation pumps, and other 
i 
farm equipment. This program was funded by the World Bank pri-
marily to promote mechanization. The majority of the loans was 
distri,buted to the sugar industry for acquiring large four-wheel 
tractdrs. 
~unds for SCPs, especially since the late 1960's, originated 
mainl~ from Central Bank operations and were channeled through 
established banking institutions. The rural banks participated 
I in almost all programs. Since 1973, however, the PNB has become 
I 
I 
a majdr participant, supplying nearly 50 percent of the M99 
I 
I loans ~nd 70 percent of the supervised loans for the corn sector. 
I 
Forei~n loans and grants formed 22 percent of total value of 
agric9ltural loans granted from 1965 to 1975, but were much more 
: 
significant in the total medium and long-term agricultural port-
! 
folio :[22]. Direct government budget financed the operation of 
I 
ACA whiich made less than 5 percent of the M99 loans. 
~everal incentives are used to induce formal lenders to 
join I • d d' srupervise ere it programs. The Central Bank provides 
initi~l loanable funds to participating banks by making a deposit, 
' 
calle~ Special Time Deposits, for a 3 percent interest rate. 
Loanatile funds for agriculture are further expanded through the 
redisaount window. At present, supervised loans are fully re-
discountable at a 1 percent rediscount rate in contrast to other 
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loans with rediscount value of 80 percent at a rate of 5 to 8 
percent. Rediscount limits are also much higher for supervised 
loans: 500 percent of lender's net worth plus 100 percent of 
savings and time deposits compared to 100 percent of net worth 
plus 50 percent of deposits for other types of loans. To reduce 
risks of default, a loan guarantee fund administered by the Land 
Bank of the Philippines protects participating lenders on up to 
85 percent of their loan losses due to natural calamities. 
The government has also attempted to increase agricultural 
credib by requiring all banks to allocate 25 percent of their 
loanable funds to agriculture, and at least 10 percent of this 
to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Because of the higher cost of 
agricultural lending, financial institutions have strongly re-
sisted following this regulation and have simply purchased 
Certificates of Indebtedness issued by the Central Bank to comply 
with the regulation instead of directly lending to agriculture. 
Historical Trends in Agricultural Credit Deli very 
Formal credit market 
Table 3 shows the growth in agricultural loans made and 
their relative share in the total loan portfolio of each 
financial institution for 1960 - 1975. Nominal value of agri-
cultur:al loans grew rapidly at 18 percent per annum during this 
perio~ but in real terms expanded only at a rate of 7 percent. 
Most df this growth took place in the 1960's. The real and 
relative levels of agricultural loans declined in the 1970's 
despite active government intervention with sectoral portfolio 
Table 3: Selected Indicators of Growth in Agricultural Loans Granted from Formal 
Institutions in the Philippines, 1960-1975 
Value of Agr. Loans Agr. Loan Agricultural loans/total loans granted 
Nominal · Real 1/ NVA in Agr.2,.All Commercial Rural Developmeat Savings Non-Bank 
C P Diillion} - Banks Banks Banks Banks Institutions 
-~------ - --
---------
1960 5J6.2 1215.9 .14 .20 .15 • 82 .17 . 06 • 01 
1961 776.1 1679.9 .19 .22 .16 .74 . 20 •OJ • 01 
1962 949.9 1954.5 . 21 .20 .16 .77 .24 • 02 • 03 
196J 1267.2 2J77·5 .24 .20 .16 • 80 • 24 • 01 . OJ 
1964 1402.1 2512.7 .25 .19 .15 ·~82 • J2 • 08 . 01 
1965 1436.2 2519.6 .2J .19 .15 . 95 • 52 .10 . 02 
1966 1622.2 2726.4 • 24 .19 .15 • 84 . 30 • 04 . 02 
I 
1967 2067.5 3389.3 . 27 .20 .16 • 86 • 38 . 01 •OJ l..D I 
1968 222J.4 3551.7 • 2JS .16 .11 • 87 . 36 . 02 • 0.3 
1969 2336.1 3678.9 . 22 .16 .11 . 88 .19 . 02 • OJ 
1970 2807.9 3576.9 . 22 .15 .10 • 89 • 40 • 01 • 04 
1971 ,;251.1 3580.5 . 21 .13 . 09 .90 • 53 . 002 . 04 
1972 )424.l 3424.l .20 .12 • 08 .90 • 55 . 01 • 05 
1973 4015.9 3225.0 .19 .10 • 06 • 91 .49 • 003 • 02 
1974 6386.6 3319.4 .22 .12 • 06 • 91 •JO . 01 • 02 
12ZS 6ZJJ·S J402.5 • 21 • 02 • 06 • 22 •OJ • 02 • 02 
!/ At 1972 prices. ~/ Net value Added 
SOURCE: [13, 22] 
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allocation. In 1975, real value of agricultural loans granted 
was still below 1969 levels. The proportion of agricultural loans 
to the net value added in agriculture and to total loans made 
dropped from a high 0.27 and 0.20 in the 1960s to a low 0.21 and 
0.09 in the 1970s, respectively. In contrast, the ratio of non-
agricultural loans to net domestic product in non-agriculture 
(0.76) is much higher. 
In Fig. 1, the trends in the relative share of the different 
insti~utions to agricultural loans are depicted. The private 
financial institutions remain the major source of agricultural 
finanQing but their share has dropped from over 80 percent in 
the early 1960s and 1970s to about one-half by the mid-seventies. 
The expansion of the public sector lending was due primarily to 
PNBs r'apid growth reflecting in part its increasing role in small 
farm credit programs. 
Riural banks' share in total agricultural loans grew from 
one-tenth in 1960 to about one-fourth by 1975. Rural banks 
allocate about 90 percent of their loans to agriculture but up 
until l973 about 85 percent of these were secured loans or loans 
to relatively large landowners. The proportion of secured loans 
declined to 50 percent during the peak of M99 in 1974 and has 
risen again to about 75 percent at present. 
Agricultural loans constitute a relatively small and de-
clining proportion of the total loan portfolio of commercial 
banks, decreasing from 16 percent to 6 percent over the past one 
and a half decades. Moreover, the bulk of their operations, in-
cluding the PNB's, is devoted to the commercial crop sector, 
partic~larly the sugar industry. 
100 DBP and ACA 
90 
80 
70 PNB 
60 
50 
40 Private Commercial Banks 
30 
20 
10 
Rural Banks 
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 
Fig. 1. Distribution of Agricultural Loans Granted by Institutional 
Sources, 1960-75· 
I 
I-' 
I-' 
I 
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,ig. 2 illustrates the predominant share of sugar and other 
commeicial agriculture in the distribution of agricultural loans. 
From 60 to 80 percent of loans granted to agriculture were allo-
cated Ito the commercial sector throughout this period. The 
recent! series of supervised credit programs have not raised the 
i 
proportion of loans to the rice and food sector to the 1976 high 
levels1. 
I 
I 
Informal credit market 
I 
Ijt would be interesting to relate growth in the formal with 
change~ in the informal financial market, but there is much less 
infornttion about the characteristics and changes of the latter. 
i 
Based .bn various farm surveys reporting sources of loans, the 
I 
relative value of formal to informal loans appears to have in-
creased from about 40 percent in the 1960s to about 65 percent 
in thel mid seventies (Table 4). Note, however, that these levels 
and tr~nds of formal share of total value of loans likely indicate 
upper ]limits because these surveys covered relatively progressive 
areas and farmers tend to underreport informal loans. 
Drspite the relative growth in the formal sector, rural 
financlial markets remain highly fragmented as evidenced by the 
I 
wide i~terest rate variation among the different sources of credit 
found even in areas most affected by government credit programs 
(Table 5). Friends, relatives, and landlords do not typically 
charge! an explicit interest rate but the weighted average annual 
100%·r--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
90 Forestry: 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
Sugar 
30 
20 
10 
1966 67 68 69 
Rice 
70 
(primarily coconut, tobacco, 
abaca,rubber) 
G>Ultry 
71 72 73 
Fig. 2. Distribution of Agricultural Loans Granted by Crops, 1966-74. 
74 75 
I 
I-' 
w 
I 
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Table 4: Sources of Agricultural Credit Based on Various Farm Surveys 
in the Philippines (in percent of total value of loans). 
Surveys Formal Informal 
1960/61: Philippines-!/ 
(all farm types) 38 62 
I 
I 2/ 1965/66: Central Luzorr-
(rice cooperative members) 57 43 
1967/68: Phi lippineJ.I 
(rice farms) 37 63 
1968/69~ PhilippineJ.I 
(rice farms) 42 54 
1970/71~ Philipp ineJ.I 
(rice farms) 53 47 
1971/72 t PhilippineJ.1 
(rice farms) 46 54 
1973: 4/ Central Luzorr-
(rice farms) 64 36 
1976: Laguna~/ 
(rice farms) 67 33 
SOURCE'S: 
.!/ [5] 
~/ [18] 
21 [4] 
ii [16] 
~/ [14] 
' ... 
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TABLE :51 Distribution of Yearly Interest rates on Loansa/ 
by Source of Credit in Laguna, 1976 Wet Season!:t' 
Friends and 
Interest Rate Total Institutional Private Relatives Relatives 
(no. of farmers) 
No Intef"est 43 #I 26 14s:./ 
I 
1-12% 97 97 
13-20% 1 1 
21-40% 4 3 1 
41-60% 4 2 2 
61-80% ! 5 1 2 2 
81-100% 39 11 27 1 
I 
101-150% 13 2 11 
151-200% 38 8 29 1 
201-32or. 7 2 5 
No Rep1r 25 11 12 
.~/Imput~d repayment in kind (palay) by 1 cavan of palay = P45. 
! b/ ! 
- Purchase of groceries on credit from village retail stores. 
Cf I 
- 11 cases in the form of unpaid rent. 
SOURCE: [ 14] 
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intere,st rate still amounted to around 60 percent.~/ Studies 
in othbr countries, however, suggest that the apparent high 
I 
interest rate in the informal market can be explained by the cost 
of cap.ital, administration, and risk, and not by monopoly profits 
as corrtonly believed [3]. A recent analysis also indicates that 
the eflfective cost of borrowing from formal sources is not too 
different from informal credit when other charges and borrowers' 
transaction costs are considered [2]. For M99 loans, the effec-
i 
tive cpst of borrowing is at least 30 percent per anniim without 
i 
accoun
1
ting for the opportunity cost of the borrower's time in 
! 3/ loan p~ocessing.-
Performance of Supervised Credit Programs 
rb this section, trends in credit delivery and repayment 
I 
rates bf the recent supervised credit programs are discussed. 
This ils followed by a review of evidence on the impact of these 
programs on farm productivity and income distribution. 
I 
Credit! delivery and repayments 
I 
I~ Table 6, the historical coverage and repayment rates of 
I 
I 
the twp most important supervised credit programs are reported. 
I 
Y Thisi is a conservative estimate for two reasons: the propor-
tioni of formal loans is probably higher than average and in 
the balculation of per annum interest rate from the ~sual 
cropi season term loan, it is assumed that informal lenders 
do nbt charge additional interest for late repayment due to 
poorl harvest. 
I 
~Assut: ing two crop loans per year, other costs are 4 percent 
for he service charge, 6 percent for Barrio Savings Fund, 
2 pe cent for rodent control, 1 percent for advanced payment 
of i terest and other charges, and borrower's transport cost 
assufied at 5 percent. 
I 
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TABLE 6 • Coverage and Repayment Rates of the Masagana 99 
and the Masaganang Maisan Supervised Credit Programs 
in the Philippines. 
Masagana 99 (Rice) 
Phase I (wei season, 19~3/74) 
II (Dry season, 
1973/74) 
III (We~ season, 
1914/75) 
IV (DrJ season, 
19~4/75) 
V (Weil season, 
1975/76) 
VI (Dryr season, 
1975/76) 
VII (We~ season, 
19716/77) 
VIII (Dr~ season, 
197.6/77) 
I 
IX (Wet season, 
1971,7/78) 
Masaganang Maisan (Corn) 
Phase I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
(Wet1 season, 
1974) 
(DrY' season, 
197.5) 
(Wet season, 
197$) 
I (Dry season, 
1976) 
(Wetl season, 
1976) 
No. of 
Borrowers ( thous·and) 
401.4 
236.1 
529.1 
354.9 
302.8 
151.J 
156.3 
81. 2 
72.6 
182.9 
102.7 
38.6 
26.6 
17.9 
Area 
Financed (thousand ha) 
621.0 
355.4 
863.6 
593.6 
558.6 
255.6 
235.2 
1J4.8 
125.9 
289.9 
145.2 
S9°4 
52.2 
40.1 
Loans 
Granted (P million) 
230.7 
716.2 
572.3 
572.9 
255.7 
264.0 
156.o 
135.0 
18).2 
108.1 
42.1 
)7.1 
19.5 
Repayment 
Rate .!/ 
<%> 
93.9 
92.9 
83.3 
80.0 
64.9 
74.o 
VI (Dry season, 
1 • 2 1 • 0 • 2 10. 
l As of June 1977 for PNB; 
SOURCE• [21] 
Aug. 1977 for ACA; and Dec. 1977 for Rural Banks. 
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The same information for other short-term credit programs is 
presented in Appendix Table 1. M99 delivered about 89 percent 
of the total loans granted to 83 percent of the total farmers 
served by supervised credit programs in recent years. At the 
peak of its operation in Phase III, about one-half of the rice 
farmers were covered by the M99 Program. The Masaganang Maisan 
is second in importance making 10 percent of total loans granted 
to 16 ~ercent of the total farmers served. 
'J:1he declining trends in the coverage and repayment rates 
are remarkably similar across programs.!/ The latest phase of 
the M9i9 program, for example, is only 15 percent as large as 
Phase III. The contraction of Masaganang Maisan is even more 
rapid. Repayment rates for both programs averaged 74 percent. 
Note that these repayment rates are evaluated at the end of 1977 
and would be much lower if computed as of due date. Using this 
latter definition, repayment rates of M99 since Phase III have 
only ranged from 30 to 50 percent. 
Loan supervision and group lending in M99 were expected to 
improvie repayment rates. These services, however, increased 
administrative cost without any measurable impact on repayment 
behav~or. Supervision is supposed to raise farmer's ability to 
repay by technical assistance and by control of loan use for 
production inputs. In practice, extension agents are assigned 
200-300 farmers each and essentially only process loans. 
!/Earlier programs by the ACCFA and ACA in the 1950s and 1960s 
expe1rienced the same fate [20]. 
-19-
Unifor~ levels of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals are 
typically recommended without due consideration of an individual 
farm's resource conditions. 
Loan use regulations are nearly impossible to implement 
becaus~ of the fungible nature of credit. Even if credit dir-
ectly burchased inputs, it may have only substituted for the 
borrower's savings and the additional liquidity diverted to non-
farm dxpenditures. Credit in kind has not prevented diversion 
as widespread cash conversion of fertilizer was observed during 
Phases, III and IV of M99 when prices of fertilizer sold for food 
I 
crops ~ere double that used for export crops. 
Group lending was designed to reduce lenders' and borrowers' 
trans~ction cost and provide social pressure for loan repayment. 
i 
Farmeis were required to form "seldas": groups of 5-15 jointly 
liable borrowers. A study in Camarines Sur showed no significant 
diffe~ence in borrowers' transaction cost and repayment rates 
due to group lending and the greater organization and collection 
effor~s with the "selda" actually raised lending costs [18]. 
In a itudy of causes of non-repayment in Central Luzon, the 
negative effect of "seldas" in farmers' repayment decision was 
i docum~nted [23]. Inability of one member to repay discourages 
I 
repayment by all the other members since they will have to cover 
defau~ting members' share or also be disqualified from borrowing 
in th~ next season. 
Although defaults may be viewed as an income transfer, 
' I 
capit~l erosion and growing numbers of disqualified borrowers 
due to high default rates directly threaten the viability of 
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any c~edit program. Despite willingness to subsidize agri-
1 
cultural credit programs, the gradual contraction of eligible 
borrowers cannot be prevented unless contracts are seriously 
enforced or loans restructured. Enforcement of contracts does not 
seem Jo be politically acceptable but unjudicious loan re-
structuring simply transforms supervised credit into a costly 
subsidy program. 
Impact of credit at the farm level 
The common approach in evaluating the impact of loans has 
been ~o compare levels of input use, production, and income 
befor~ and after the program or between borrowers and non-
borrowers using farm survey data [6,7,8,9,16,17]. Table 7 
illustrates the types of variables and general results typically 
found in these studies based on a series of surveys conducted 
by the International Rice Research Institute as part of their 
research project entitled "Constraints to High Rice Yields on 
Asian Rice Farms." Inter-crop seasonal differences in the 
figures reflect in part the effect of changes in the sample of 
I 
farmerls interviewed. 
Masagana 99 borrowers consistently had larger farms than 
non-bdrrowers while borrowers from informal sources appear to 
have qn the average the same farm size as non-borrowers. Cash 
inputs and net income per hectare were about 15 percent higher 
for M99 borrowers but note the greater net income difference 
during the seasons when cash inputs were relatively less. The 
lower 
1
cash inputs of borrowers from informal sources, which may 
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TABLE 7: Comparison of Resource Use and Net Farm Income Per 
Hectare by Source of Credit in Laguna, NuevaEcija, 
' and Camarines Sur (Wet Season, 1975 to Wet Season, 
1977). 
Variables 
I 
No. of f~rmers 
! M99 ! 
Other loan 
No loan 
Farm size (ha) 
M99 
Other loan 
No loan 
M99 
No loart 
Other ~oan 
No loa 
Cash inputs (P/ha) 
M99 
Other ~oan 
No loatj 
M99 
No loan 
I 
Other ltjoan 
No loan 
Net income (P/ha) 
M99 ! 
Other loan 
No loan 
M99 
No loan 
Other lloan 
No loan 
SOURCE• [9] 
Wet 
1975 
56 
48 
46 
2.24 
L 84 
1°93 
1.16 
.95 
408 
224 
262 
. 85 
2040 
1783 
1797 
1.14 
• 99 
Season/Year 
Dry Wet 
1976 1976 
57 
57 
50 
2.17 
l. 81 
1.72 
1.26 
i.05 
500 
357 
368 
. 97 
1818 
1970 
1824 
1.00 
1.08 
65 
50 
36 
2.02 
2.01 
1.83 
1.10 
1.10 
438 
327 
516 
.85 
.63 
2018 
1378 
1721 
• 80 
Dry 
1977 
66 
48 
60 
2.11 
1.66 
1.78 
1.19 
577 
632 
592 
. 97 
3112 
3074 
2990 
1.04 
LOJ 
Wet 
1977 
94 
55 
47 
2.27 
2.25 
2.11 
1.08 
1.07 
523 
374 
518 
1.01 
.72 
2J44 
1867 
1714 
1.37 
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indicate lower optimal input levels or greater financial con-
straiJt, was not accompanied by any difference in net income 
per hectare with respect to non-borrowers. 
Differences found in the partial comparisons of variables 
between borrowers and non-borrowers should not be readily 
attri~uted to credit. Additional analysis is required to separ-
ate the effect of credit from other possible factors such as 
differences in technology, technical and managerial knowledge, 
irrigation, yield and price uncertainties, relative input-output 
price~, initial level of financial constraints and so forth. 
Yield variability caused by weather conditions, for example, 
explaips part of the annual net income variation and the greater 
net income difference between M99 borrowers and non-borrowers 
when cash inputs are relatively lower. Moreover, non-price 
ration!ing of cheap formal credit tends to favor farmers with 
superior factor endowments as evidenced by the larger farm size 
of M99' borrowers. 
The attribution problem was minimized by Mandac and Herdt 
using econometric techniques [15] . Supplementing the Nueva 
Ecija farm survey with data from experiments conducted on the 
same f 1armer' s fields, farmer's ability to allocate resources 
efficiently were explained in terms of financial constraint and 
availapility of credit, managerial ability, measures of uncer-
tainty,and environmental variables. Table 8 reports the re-
gression results which show that most of the significant 
explanatory variables relate to financial constraints. Farm 
size reduces supply of liquid capital per hectare while family 
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Table 8: Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Variation in 
1 Allocative Efficiency Gap ~ong a Sample of 56 Rice 
Farmers in the Philippines (Wet Season, 1974 to Dry 
Season, 1977). 
Variables 
Intercept 
I 
Intercept dummy variables 
Credit (1 = non-borrowers) 
Labor $carcity (1 = scarce labor) 
Tenancy (1 = share tenant) 
Irrigation (1 = unirrigated) 
Risk index (1 = higher risk) 
Gross family income 
Total area 
Information index 
Age of f•rmer operator 
Years of 1education 
Number of days off farm 
Technical knowledge score 
R2 = 1• 77 
n = )36 
Coefficient 
i.7490 
-0.4369* 
0.0249 
-0.28)6 
-0.0075* 
-0~'1302 
0.00003* 
-3.0731* 
0.1713* 
-0.0091 
-0.2418 
0.0026* 
0.0397 
*Statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
SOURCE: [ 15] 
t-value 
-2.1260 
0.0913 
-0.820) 
-3.2051 
-0.6500 
3.0000 
-9.5497 
1.801) 
-1.0225 
-1.2002 
2.0813 
o.4091 
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income and credit increases its availability. The highly 
signiflicant coefficient for irrigation indicates the importance 
of risk in farmers' decisions. Knowledge variables seem to be 
less oritical in this sample of farms although the information 
index .and number of days working off farm were significant. 
~he above studies cited simply tested whether credit has 
had a 'statistically significant impact on allocative efficiency. 
To measure cos-effectiveness of agricultural credit, an estimate 
of benefits of credit use is needed which can be compared to 
i the cqst of the credit policy. 
I 
~osegrant simulated the impact of supervised loans on input 
use, ~ield and net farm income [19). His model specified 
farmeis' decision processes over several seasons, taking account 
of rislks due to weather and insects, and consumption propensi-
i 
ties i 1n a typical rice farm in Nueva Ecija using econometrically 
estimated coefficients. His results indicate a much smaller 
input and productivity response to changes in nominal interest 
rates !compared to changes in loan limits (Table 9) • Potential 
effects of a supervised credit program with a low interest rate 
of 8 percent per season and high loan limit of !11200/ha instead 
of th~ informal sector with an interest rate of 24 percent and 
a loaq limit of !1300/ha resulted in an increase of 70 percent, 
I 
23 percent and 23 percent on fertilizer input, yields and net 
income
1
, respectively. A great part of these changes is due 
to morle liberal loan limits rather than lower interest rates. 
Riosegrant's approach in deriving benefit of credit is 
lim;i'.teki by· th.e narrow farm f;i:;-~mewo~k of an.al,y,s~s ~ The potenti:al 
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TABLE [9: Average Simulated Farmers Borrowings, Input Use and 
Production Results from Farmer Decision Model with 
Two Nominal Interest Rates and Three Loan Size Liroi ts 
Financial Market Comp le-
Interest Loan mentary 
Rate 
1 
Limit Nitrogen Inputs Loan Yield Income 
(%/seasor) (P/ha) (kg/ha) (P /ha) (P/ha) (kg/ha) (P /ha) 
8 I 1200 80 204 482 2402 847 
8 600 78 175 445 2350 840 
8 300 49 73 292 1971 737 
24 1200 75 204 475 2374 759 
24 600 73 175 445 2320 773 
24 300 47 66 292 1951 686 
SOURCE: ![ 19] 
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impact of credit on non-farm activities or present consumption 
were not considered. Given the fungible nature of loans, it 
would be very difficult to determine the degree of underestima-
tion of a partial measure of farm instead of farm-household 
benefits. Also, the use of nominal interest rates which under-
states. the effective cost of borrowing by the borrower's trans-
action cost, may have overestimated the effect of supervised 
credit. 
Income distribution effect 
Formal credit at concessionary interest rates is considered 
a simple instrument for redistributing income to small farmers 
facing apparently high interest rates in the informal markets. 
Gonzalez-Vega, among others, has argued that the opposite effect 
is often realized because excess demand for credit leads to non-
price rationing usually favoring larger sized loans made by 
wealthier farmers with collateral or proven records of repay-
ment [10]. 
Income transferred through concessionary interest rates is 
not small. Assuming an equilibrium real interest rate of 
10 percent, which is similar to the U.S. for comparable types 
of loans where capital is relatively abundant, the negative 
real interest rates of 10 percent in the Philippines during 
the 1970s imply an annual income transfer of about ~800 rnillion. 5/ 
~/ The assumption seems reasonable given the 60 percent average 
nominal interest rate in the informal market. This method-
ology followed Vogel's estimation for Costa Rica [25]. 
-27-
The subsidy, which represents about 4 percent of gross domestic 
product in agriculture, is shouldered by holders of currency, 
bank deposits and taxpayers in general through inflation, low 
interest rate on savings, and direct government outlay. 
Government policies regarding credit distribution are to 
some extent not supportive of the poorer segment of the rural 
sector. Only farm operators are entitled to institutional credit 
despite the significant number of landless households in the 
rural areas. During the early phases of the M99, the program 
was limited to irrigated areas close to primary markets, i.e., 
relatively progressive locations. The procedure of setting loan 
limits on a per hectare basis means a greater credit ceiling 
for farm households with larger farms. 
Empirical evidence to demonstrate who benefits from con-
cessionary interest rate policies are scanty. Less than 15 per-
cent of the value of loans in the CB-IBRD Loan Program was used 
for power tillers of small farmers [11]. Four-wheel tractors 
and other large farm equipment was purchased with the bulk of 
the loans by sugar farmers with 50 hectares or more who consti-
tuted less than 10 percent of the number of farmers in 1971. 
As discussed in the earlier section, sugar farmers have histor-
ically received the largest share of formal credit. 
A rough approximation of the pattern of credit distribution 
by farm size in 1967 and 1974 compared to the distribution of 
farm households are presented in Table 10. Seventy-three percent 
of the farm households with less than 3 hectares received only 
2 percent of value of formal loans granted in 1967. Relatively 
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TABLE 101: Distribution of Farm Households and Formal 
Loans Granted by Farm Size (%) 
12oz 12Zl4'. 
No. of!/ Value of No. ofY Value of 
Farm size farms loans farms 
Less thlll'I 1 hj 14 
73 2 
1-under J has 47 
3-under S haj 24 27 98 
Over 5 ha,s 15 
l/ Based on 1961 Agricultural Census, Bureau of Census and 
Statistics (BCS). 
£1 Based on 1971 Agricultural Census, BCS. 
SOURCE• [22] 
loans 
1 
19 
8 
72 
.. 
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more small farmers were served in 1974, but this may have 
I 
worsened with the rapid contraction of M99 since then. 
Policy Implications 
T~e analysis in the previous sections raises some questions 
about the wisdom of current agricultural financial policies. 
Aggregate agricultural loans made have declined in real terms. 
Empirical studies have not clearly identified any significant 
impact of supervised credit programs on productivity and in-
come growth. Distribution of credit does not seem to be con-
sisten!t with equity goals. Past experience also does not warrant 
an optimistic outlook regarding the long-run viability of super-
' 
vised credit programs. It is argued in this section that the 
choice of policy instruments would have been more appropriate 
in improving rural welfare if the longer-run objective of 
establishing a viable rural financial market was given more 
emphasis. This policy redirection implies at least two approaches: 
using ~ore flexible interest rates and increasing flexibility 
in the use and timing of agricultural loans. 
Letting the price of borrowing and lending more closely 
reflect the true cost of capital would lead financial institutions 
to mor!e efficiently reallocate resources from economic uni ts 
with lower productive opportunities to those with higher pro-
ductive opportunities. Correct price signals would also improve 
resource allocation within farm-households between consumption 
and savings, labor and capital, and among enterprises. Interest 
rates 'and specialized credit programs are likely to be less 
" .. 
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efficient policy instruments in affecting sectoral or input 
allocation compared to price policy or irrigation development. 
Adams pointed out that assumptions about lender and borrower 
behavior which seem to underlie low interest rate policies such 
as inberest elastic credit demand and lack of rural savings 
capacity have not been supported by recent empirical analysis 
[l]. He particularly emphasized how negative real interest 
rates on savings deposits and artificially low rediscount rates 
discourage financial institutions from mobilizing savings in 
the rural areas. The Philippine experience reflects this con-
cern as indicated in Table 11. Rapid growth in loans granted 
by the rural banking sector has originated mainly from the re-
discount window of the Central Bank. The share of equity 
capital and deposits to total bank resources decreased by 
66 percent and 33 percent, respectively between 1961 and 1975. 
Reliance on borrowings, on the other hand, rose almost three-
fold from 18 percent to 54 percent during the same period. 
Rural banks appear to function as retailers of Central Bank 
money ,instead of mobilizers of resources in the rural sector. 
Improving the flexibility in timing and use of small 
farmer credit would likely reduce the cost of administration 
and default in these programs. Low returns on agricultural 
lending and misconceptions about the role and nature of credit 
in the farm-household context largely explain the controls 
imposed on timing and use of credit. Most of the economic 
analysis of agricultural credit seems to view credit as an 
input of production ignoring the fungibility of credit and 
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TABLE 11 :, Pattern of Resource Structure of Rural 
Banks in the Philippines (%). 
1961 1965 1969 1973 
Equity Capital 45 44 36 23 
Deposits 32 28 32 32 
Borrowings 18 24 22 39 
Miscellaneous 5 4 10 6 
Source: [13] 
1975 
16 
25 
54 
6 
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the interdependence of production and consumption decisions 
within the farm-household. The farm-household will allocate 
additional units of liquidity (including credit) according to 
which activity--farm inputs, non-farm investment, present 
consumption--will give a higher level of marginal utility. 
Loan supervision to disseminate technical knowledge and 
regulate loan use will not likely be effective. Linking 
extension with loan administration quickly dissipates the 
efforts of scarce competent technicians and neither task is 
accomplished efficiently. Regulating loan use may have little 
influence on the allocation of additional liquidity permitted 
by loans. Even if loans are directly spent on fertilizer, 
this may be simply substituting for their own savings and 
additionality may occur in the non-farm activities. Allocation 
of credit is affected by rate of profitability, marginal rate 
of time preference for present consumption, and so forth rather 
than by rules. Limiting the role of supervision to loan pro-
cessing and more active collection effort is expected to lower 
transaction costs and default rates. 
A more flexible credit program would raise repayment rates 
by increasing the value of good credit ratings with formal 
lenders. Several studies found that farmers tend to repay 
informal loans first suggesting a greater value to a good credit 
rating with the informal lender despite the apparently lower 
interest rate of formal loans [23]. One explanation is the 
ability of informal lenders to help farmers cope with unexpected 
shortfalls in income or increases in household expenditures 
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especially important under Philippine environmental conditions. 
Borrowing from informal sources even at 50-100 percent interest 
rates may indeed be preferable because of more flexible use 
and timing and more reliable supply of credit than formal sources. 
1he arguments presented to justify the two suggested policy 
changes admittedly are contrary to conventional beliefs about 
farm-household financial behavior. Part of the difficulty of 
policymakers in accepting the wisdom of these policy changes 
sterns from the limited empirical studies on the responsiveness 
of fa~rn-household credit demand to changes in policy variables, 
and other related micro-level analysis. More analytical research 
about .borrower and lender behavior is required to more effectively 
influence policymaking in this area. 
" . 
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Appendix Table 1: Coverage of Selected Supervised Credit Programs 
No. of Area Loans 
Borrowers Financed Granted 
1. Gulayan sa Kalusugan!/ 
Phase I (Dry season 
1974/75) 
Phase II (Dry season 
1975/76) 
Phase III (Dry season 
1976/77) 
Phase IV (Dry season 
1977/78) 
2. Tobacco Financing 
Program!?/ 
Phase I (Oct. 1975-
Jul. 1976) 
Phase II {Aug. 1976-
Jul. 1977) 
Phase III (Oct. 1977-
Jul. 1978) 
3. Cotton Financing 
Programy 
Phase I (Dry season 
1974/7.5) 
Phase II (Dry season 
1975/76) 
Phase III {Dry season 
1976/77) 
!I As of October 1977· 
~ As of January 1978. 
£1 As of September 1977. 
SOURCE• [22] 
(thousand} (thousand ha} (P thousand) 
4.1 
3.6 
0.2 
6.2 
6.5 
4.2 
0.3 
1. 5 
4.4 
No credit component 
5.5 
3.3 
0.2 
5.4 
3.9 
2.4 
0.2 
0.8 
2.2 
8705.9 
6464.5 
205.4 
11173.9 
6535.8 
3898.2 
585.8 
1336.J 
3497.5 
Repayment 
Rate (%) 
80 
90 
76 
76 
99 
65 
61 
